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The Indian diaspora has come out of the shadows in recent years. 
South Asians have transformed the face of the country that once 
colonized them. While software engineers were bringing Indians into 
the top echelons of the American corporate world, both Trinidad and 
Fiji witnessed the ascendancy of prime ministers of Indian descent. 
Even Bollywood, which always had a global presence in the southern 
hemisphere, has now come to the attention of the West. The 
comparatively small Indian diaspora has indubitably become a part of 
world culture. Curiously, this "triumph", if one may call it that, is 
accompanied by an immense anxiety, an anxiety of influence. Though 
Indians have done very well for themselves in the US, there is a 
widespread feeling that they remain invisible. Most professional 
Indians, especially Hindus, are persuaded that the world rides 
roughshod over them. The inability of the Indian nation-state to flex 
its muscles overseas is profoundly disturbing to Hindus, and though 
the recognition that yoga, samosas, curry, spiritual gurus, and beauty 
queens have brought to India is appreciated, Indians would much 
rather see India respected, even feared, as a world power. This 
anxiety of influence is conjoined with another -- namely, an anxiety 
that Hinduism is not quite a proper, and certainly not a world, 
religion. The transformations wrought within Hinduism in recent 
years, which are calculated to masculinize and homogenize the faith, 
are more productively viewed in this context. 
The Indian diaspora has, it appears, come out of the shadows in recent years, 
and its once largely forgotten histories, which encompass narratives of 
displacement and migration, are increasingly being viewed as an important and 
intrinsic part of the story of humanity's drift, in late modernity, towards 
globalization, transnational economic and cultural exchanges, and hybrid forms of 
political, cultural, and social identity. From Britain, the United States, and Canada 
to many of the less affluent nations of the South, the Indian diaspora seems to have 
registered its presence among those who are not generally inclined to lavish 
attention on India or its cultural mores. South Asians have, as many have 
suggested, transformed the face of the country that once colonized them, and in 
'Balti Britain' chicken tikka masala has nearly become the national dish/ much as 
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the corner shop, once one of the quintessential representations of Englishness, has 
now become a Gujarati enclave. In the 1990s, Trinidad and Fiji both saw the 
emergence, though scarcely without misgivings on the part of considerable 
segments of their population, of prime ministers of Indian descent; in British 
Columbia, meanwhile, Ujjal Dosanjh, once a village boy in the Punjab, rose to the 
'office of the Premier. The Indian presence in the United States is even more 
striking, and newspapers emanating from the large Indian community are prolific 
in their celebration of software engineers who have brought Indians into the top 
echelons of the American corporate world. Once upon a time Indians were 
devouring the novels of Walter Scott, Charles Dickens, and Jane Austen; now, both 
the novel, and the English language, have been enlivened in the hands of South 
Asian writers of the diaspora - Vikram Seth, Amitav Ghosh, Salman Rushdie, VS 
Naipaul, his more gifted brother Shiva Naipaul, Arundhati Roy, Rohinton Mistry, 
Harold Sonny Ladoo, Anita Desai, and KS Maniam, among others. Even 
Bollywood, which always had a global presence in the southern hemisphere, seems 
poised to encroach upon territory that Hollywood took for granted. The diaspora, 
as an entire stream of recent films testifies, is never far from Bollywood' s horizon; 
on the other hand, now that the West has awoken to the modern Hindi cinema, 
"Bollywood" and "culture" can be spoken of in the same breath without acute 
embarrassment. These are but fragments of a story that is now beginning to be told 
of a comparatively small diaspora that has indubitably become a part of world 
culture. 
In the midst of these celebrations over the awakening, and perhaps emerging 
influence, of the Indian Diaspora, recently epitomized in the gathering of delegates 
from all over the world under the bosom of mother India in a capital city designed 
to trumpet the majesty of the British Empire/ few people have paused to probe the 
circumstances under which the Indian diaspora should have arisen from the ashes 
over the last few years, and what this awakening portends for India, its diasporic 
people, and Hinduism, a religion the vast bulk of whose practitioners are still to be 
found in India. Though it would be something of an exaggeration to suggest that 
there has always been an Indian diaspora, the modern history of indentured labor 
begins with the transportation of Indians to Mauritius in 183 5, and the dispersal of 
Indians over lar~e parts of the Caribbean by the mid-1850s. In 1995, Trinidad 
marked the 1501 anniversary of the arrival of Indians in that Caribbean island; 
indeed, "Arrival Day" is now a national (albeit contested) holiday in Trinidad & 
Tobago, though, I suspect, few middle-class people in India, much less anywhere 
else in the world, must be aware of this singularly interesting fact. One might think, 
then, apropos of the recent excitement over the diaspora, that the modern diaspora 
began when Indian CEOs of Silicon Valley corporate empires could be cited as 
authentic signs of the Indian diasporic presence, as figures worthy of emulation. 
Yet, since "success" is the all-meaningful concept that endears Indians in the 
industrialized West to the millions of middle-class Indians who await the call to 
migration, one wonders why the success stories of Indians in Trinidad or Fiji, 
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whose accomplishments by any measure were far more heroic, have never quite 
become part ofthe folklore of middle-class Indian sensibility. The largest business 
enterprises in Trinidad are owned mainly by Indians, but much more poignant is 
this: Indian hands, as George Lamming (1989:47) wrote, humanized the landscapes 
in the British Caribbean; it is also Indian hands that put the food on the table in 
Fijian homes. Similarly, though the recent worldwide circulation of India's 
information technology specialists is now narrativized as part of the history of 
globalization, as a promising instance of how globalization tells the story not 
merely of the inroads made by the West but of the rapid strides that can be made by 
elites of developing nations to insert themselves into the apparatus of global 
governance, one must ask why the dispersal of indentured labor - Indian, Chinese, 
Japanese to remote parts of the globe in the nineteenth century is not customarily 
written into the history of globalization. 
It is possible to argue, of course, that the present interest in the Indian 
diaspora owes a great deal to a concatenation of circumstances. Until quite 
recently, the prevailing sociological framework insisted upon categories such as 
migration, emigration, and immigration, and the bulk of the scholarly effort was 
devoted to an understanding of how immigrant communities assimilated into the 
host country. For a variety of reasons, not least of which is the fact that 
immigration studies pointed largely.to a centripetal view of host societies, so much 
so that the reigning metaphor for America as an immigrant society was "the 
melting pot", the term "diaspora" came into usage as a preferred term to describe 
the shifting focus towards immigrant societies as comprised of diasporic peoples 
whose histories radiated outwards as much as inwards. In the revised model, 
diasporic people bore a centrifugal relationship to their adopted land, and insofar as 
there were any centripetal tendencies to their thinking, they revolved around the 
construction of the land of their origin as a spiritual home. Moreover, though the 
term "diaspora" was itself understood as bearing, in its primal usage, a precise 
reference to the dispersal of the Jewish people, there emerged a widespread feeling 
that the history of various communities Palestinians, Chinese, Armenians, Indians, 
among others outside their traditional homeland could not be conceived except in 
the language of diaspora. In the era of globalization, the notion of "diaspora" was 
perforce among the first to be globalized. 3 
Quite apart from the fact that diasporic studies began to fuel interest in the 
Indian diaspora, there is the consideration that the diaspora's own histories were 
beginning to take on different shapes and hues. Not until the late 1980s did the 
term "NRI", the Non-Resident Indian, become ubiquitous enough in middle-class 
homes and government policy documents alike that it required no explanation and 
little commentary. So long as "overseas Indians", as diasporic Indians were 
generally known, were largely confined to Fiji, Mauritius, Guyana, Malaysia, and 
other parts of the under-developed and developing world, the Indian government 
showed little enthusiaSm in viewing them as Indians, or creating a special niche for 
them in Indian society. Successive governments appeared to subscribe to the views 
22 Australian Religion Studies Review 
articulated by Jawaharlai'Nehru, who espoused the view that overseas Indians were 
best calculated to serve their own interests, and safeguard their achievements and 
gains, by partaking in the political life of the country that they had adopted as their 
home. They could make no substantive claims on India. That was the position 
taken by Nehru when, as the country's Prime Minister, he was petitioned by 
Indians who faced eviction from Burma [now Myanmar]. In the defense of the 
Indian government's position, one might plausibly argue that these Indians of the 
older diaspora had ceased to have any living connection with India, though this is 
in any case much less true of what w·as then Burma's Indian population, but in 
truth the Indian government was scarcely positioned to intervene when overseas 
Indians were subject to discrimination and outright racism. Thus the government 
could do nothing to prevent the expulsion of Indians from Kenya and Uganda, and 
even with respect to Fiji, where the Indians exercised a slim numerical majority 
until quite recently, the Indian government was incapable of anything more than a 
toothless response to the coup of 1987, which resulted in the first substantial 
exodus of Indians to Australia, New Zealand, Britain, and North America. 
Expulsion of a country from the Commonwealth not only received no attention in 
most of the Western media, but was calculated to elicit derisive remarks about the 
irrelevance ofthe Commonwealth to the course of global politics. 
By the mid-1980s, however, the term NRI was beginning to come into vogue, 
and this transpired not because the Indian government, or the Indian public, were 
suddenly and inexplicably awakened to the presence of large Indian populations in 
many countries of the South. For one thing, the passage of the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act in 1965 once again opened those doors to Indians that were shut 
in the 1920s (Lal, 1999b ), and in twenty years a generation of educated Indians had 
established a name for themselves in the various professions across the United 
States. In India, Rajiv Gandhi's ascendancy to power held out the promise that 
geriatric bureaucrats and Nehruvian socialists would be sent into retirement, and 
the future of the country delivered into the hands of technocrats, entrepreneurs, and 
other so-called visionaries who were known to be sympathetic to ideas to jump-
start India into the computer age and, as it was commonly put then, bypass the 
bullock cart and the spinning wheel. Rajiv Gandhi's selection of Sam Pitroda as his 
Chief Advisor on matters of technology in 1987 marked the moment of the NRI's 
triumphant entry into the discursive formation of Indian modernity.4 Having made 
a name for himself in the field of telecommunications in the US, Pitroda, who first 
came to the US in the mid-1960s to earn a higher degree in electrical engineering, 
returned to India in the early 1980s. Only 3 percent of India's villages at that time 
had telephone service. The hagiographic accounts describe Pitroda, who also 
assumed the Chairmanship of the Telephone Commission, as fired by the vision to 
see India linked telephonically, and the yellow STD-ISD phone booths which now 
dot the entire country are said to be the consequence of Pitroda's aggressive drive 
to implement a technological revolution in Indian society.5 
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The trends set into motion by Rajiv Gandhi were accelerated under successive 
political administrations, and as the liberalization of the economy became 
enshrined as official economic policy, the NRI was viewed as the most likely 
source of direct foreign investment in India. The older Indian diasporic populations 
were, by contrast, seen as liabilities, as ugly reminders of the country's servitude 
under the British.6 However, as Pitroda's story suggests, much else would be 
invested in the figure of the Non-Resident Indian. If the idea of the diaspora has 
always entailed the idea of the return to the homeland, Pitroda was the true 
diasporic or non-resident Indian who, not forgetting his roots, had returned to serve 
the motherland. Non-resident Indians had to be envisioned as something of a 
revolutionary vanguard; they also furnished the country's lifeline to the immense 
changes being wrought in the North by the information superhighway and other 
forms of technological wizardry. Non-resident Indians would, consequently, 
themselves become the very instantiation of globalization, indeed, in many middle-
class homes in India, figures of nearly mythic proportions. The matrimonial section 
of the Sunday edition of the major English dailies reflected this changing reality, 
creating a new column for "Green Card holders", with the obvious implication that 
green card men would be able to command higher dowries, while green card 
women, with their earning potential, were themselves a form of dowry for an 
Indian groom. The NRI, unlike the "overseas Indian" of earlier generations, has 
arrived; he belongs to the developed, not the developing, world; and in him cannot 
be writ large the oppressive narrative of development, which condemns those who 
belong to the developing world to always, but always, arrive late at their 
destination. Just how much the NRI marks the triumphant emergence of the Indian 
diaspora as a factor on the world stage can be gauged by the fact that the Indian 
government has finally conceded, if only in principle, the demand for dual 
citizenship; but while allowing this concession, it has, through a set of stringent 
requirements, effectively shut out from this privilege diasporic Indians not settled 
in the industrialized nations of the North. 
One can be entirely certain, indeed, that were it not for the NRI, a term which, 
as I have suggested, works on two different registers, the Indian Government could 
scarcely have been bothered with convening a large gathering of influential 
diasporic Indians in New Delhi earlier this year. The previous occasion when the 
Indian government, then the vehicle of colonialist policies, legislated in any truly 
significant way to regulate its relationship to the Indian diaspora was in 1917 when 
the entire system of indentured labor, which had already gone into decline, was 
brought to a complete halt. There have, of course, been numerous occasions when 
the Indian government has sought to monitor the movement of Indian labor, most 
particularly to the Gulf countries, and twice, in 1990-91 and 2003, it has repatriated 
Indians from Iraq and Kuwait at its own expense. But diasporic Indians in 
Trinidad, Surinam, Mauritius, South Africa and elsewhere have never labored 
under the illusion that the Indian Government had any substantive interest in their 
welfare, or was keen on embracing them as Indians who had strayed far from their 
24 Australian Religion Studies Review 
home. All over the non-NRI Indian diaspora, there is considerable speculation on 
what prompts mother India at this particular juncture to make its children cling to 
its bosom. 
That the Indian Government chose to inaugurate Pravasi [emigrant] Bharatiya 
Diwas on 9 January 2003 should not go unnoticed. On January 91h, 1915, 
Mohandas Gandhi, not then the Mahatma, returned to India after a long stint in 
South Africa. The rest, as the cliche goes, is history; and yet, as is true of all 
histories, much is also occluded in the conventional narratives. The bulk of the 
indentured laborers who arrived on the shores of South Africa, Guyana, Surinam, 
Trinidad, Jamaica, Fiji, Malaysia, and Mauritius could scarcely exercise the choice 
of returning to India; some, who had never traveled more than a few kilometers 
from their village in the hinterland, were even unaware that they were leaving 
India. There is ample evidence of people deceived into believing that they were 
being taken to places where land was plentiful, where with earnest labor savings 
could be accumulated and a return to one's own homeland be undertaken at the end 
of the contractual period, which was usually five years (Tinker, 1974; Cumpston, 
1969). Gandhi, by contrast, chose to make his living in South Africa, and during 
his long sojourn there, extending over two decades, he journeyed across the oceans 
to India and Britain more than once. Not to speak of Gandhi's own time, even a 
century later entire generations of Indo-Fijians and Indo-Trinidadians know India 
only through Tulsidas's Ramacaritmanas and Bollywood, remarkably and not 
inaptly placed in apposition, and have no first-hand familiarity with the country of 
their origin, or what is described as their origin. Though I would scarcely belittle 
the social knowledge generated by these two unique artifacts ·of the Indian 
sensibility, the point remains that Gandhi, as he criss-crossed the oceans, 
prefigured the more recent Indian diaspora that makes its home in the industrial 
West than the diaspora that originated, to invoke Hugh Tinker, as another form of 
slavery. 
But it is for more than this reason that the embrace of the moment of Gandhi's 
return by the present Indian government is supremely troubling. Among Indian 
governments since independence was acquired in 1947, none has harbored more 
assassins of Gandhi's memory than the present government, and none has been 
more sympathetic to Gandhi's killers. No amount of prevarication can conceal this 
brutally unpleasant fact, and the recent installation in the Indian Parliament of the 
portrait of Vinayak Damodar ("Veer'') Savarkar, who was charged with conspiring 
to murder Gandhi but acquitted for lack of evidence, is not merely testimony to the 
disdain in which Gandhi, the so-called "Father of the Nation", is held by the 
political elites of the ruling party, but evidence of their confidence that over time 
the memory of Gandhi can be altogether excised. Savarkar's portrait now hangs 
opposite that of Gandhi, but the time may not be far removed when his portrait 
alone will remain. Nathuram Godse's patrons in the former Hindu Mahasabha and 
the RSS stalk the corridors of power, and the Bharatiya Janata Party's ideological 
allies include parties and organizations, such as the Shiv Serra and the Bajrang Dal, 
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whose contempt for Gandhi is not even disguised. The Bajrang Dal celebrates 
January 301h as the occasion when "Mahatma Nathuram Godse" showed his Hindu 
brothers and sisters the path to martyrdom, and put before them the ultimate 
example of courage and wisdom, by doing away with the life of "Duratma 
Mohandas Gandhi". As the recent press release of HinduUnity.Org says in its 
panegyric to Godse, "We will be indebted to him forever because some of us know 
that we would either be dead today or converted to Islam if it wasn't for the 
removal of this poisonous thorn [Gandhi] that could have continued to the 
irreversible damage to the welfare of the Hindu people."7 A deep hatred for 
Gandhi, who is seen as a bumbling old fool who emasculated the Hindu nation by 
his insistence on non-violence, and embraced feminine practices of fasting, 
spinning, prayer, and listening to the "inner voice", animates the thinking of 
Hindutva ideologues. Thus, when the Indian Government conducted its nuclear 
tests in May 1998, and that too on the occasion of Buddha Purnima [Birth 
Anniversary], the clear intent was not only to signify to the world India's prowess, 
but to lay to rest the spectre of Gandhi. 
If, as I have suggested, the NRI is the very instantiation of the idea of 
globalization, then the ironies are further compounded when we consider that no 
one in our times has had a more far-reaching critique of a globalized world than 
Gandhi in whose name, so to speak, the Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas was staged. One 
marvels at the fact thatthe special supplement on the Indian diaspora jointly 
published on the occasion of the Diwas by Asian Voice and Gujarat Samachar, the 
magazines with the largest circulation among Britain's Indian communities, 
features an article, without so much as a trace of irony or recognition of the 
absurdity of the claim, entitled "Gandhi The greatest NRI ever" (Anon, 2003). The 
cover reinforces the representation of a Indian diaspora globalized as much by the 
peregrinations and presence of Gandhi as much as by anything else: the NRI, as the 
cartographic strategy suggests, is on the forward move. Globalization flattens the 
world; but even its critics, . who resolutely oppose the homogenization of the 
world's cultures, endorse the idea of what might be called "one world". The very 
commitment to the United Nations that liberals display stems precisely from the 
sentiment that a system of global governance, if it could only be rid of the zero-
sum view of politics that manifestly guides the conduct of nation-states, is best 
calculated to produce one world. No one understood better than Gandhi that the 
idea of "one world" would be predicated on Western universalisms, and that such 
universalisms would continue to derive their sustenance from their purportedly 
heroic opposition to non-European or indigenous particularisms. Early on in his 
life, as Hind Swaraj a text dated to 1909, and oneto which Gandhi would remain 
attached for the rest of his life amply demonstrates, Gandhi came to the realization 
that oppression would increasingly be exercised in the name of categories such as 
"development", "growth", and "the international community" derived from 
Western knowledge ·systems. Gandhi anticipated, then, the most substantive 
critique of globalization, one that even today is less frequently understood: nothing 
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has been as effectively globalized as the knowledge systems of the West and the 
intellectual categories derived from the academic disciplines that are now the 
mainstay of institutionalized knowledge (Lal, 2002). 
That the most radical rebel of modem history should have been transformed 
into something as banal as the NRI is suggestive of the profound ambiguities 
attendant upon the "triumph", if one may call it that, of the recent Indian diaspora. 
Evidence of the Indianization of the globe, as I have commented previously, 
appears everywhere, and the widespread and rapidly increasing diffusion of Indian 
cuisine, the film music of Bollywood, classical North Indian music, diasporic 
Indian literature, yoga and other manifestations of real and supposed Hindu 
spirituality, and Indian fashions such as the hindi and henna tell part of the story; 
the other part of the narrative is told through the familiar figures oflndian doctors, 
computer engineers, information technology specialists, statisticians, Wall Street 
bankers, venture capitalists, and let us not forget the Gujaratis who have 
established their presence as merchants, shopkeepers, traders, and businessmen of 
vast affluence. However, that I should speak of "Indian cuisine" in the singular is 
telling, since Indianization of cultural practices and norms can only operate within 
the discursive formations of globalization. The globalization of Indian cuisine 
demanded that all Indian cuisine be reduced to a generally generic form of North 
Indian tandoori cooking, though doubtless more sophisticated consumers will 
increasingly veer towards the lesser known variants of Indian cooking. The same 
phenomenon is witnessed in the domain of classical Indian dance: though there are 
several different schools or styles of dance, in the West Bharat Natyam 
predominates. Classical Indian music exhibits the same tendency in the West: 
instrumentalists such as Ravi Shankar gained with relative ease a considerable 
following, but vocalists, from Amir Khan to Veena Sahasrabuddhe, whose music is 
vastly more demanding for untutored ears, command much smaller audiences. 
The ambivalence of this triumph of "Indianization" of cultural phenomena is 
equally writ large in the NRI's disposition towards Gandhi. As Gandhi's 
worldwide reputation from the 1920s onwards, and the complex manner in which 
he has been appropriated by astonishingly diverse constituencies, from nudists, 
vegetarians, naturopaths, and radical exponents of deep ecology to anarchists, civil 
rights activists, human rights campaigners, non-violent resisters, and even 
corporate firms such as Apple Computers, unequivocally suggests, Gandhi himself 
became globalized. To speak of Gandhi, as Nehru once remarked, was to speak of 
India. Yet, to the Indian middle class, and to its affluent NRI representatives in the 
US, Canada, and other spheres of the North, Gandhi had long become a figure of 
supreme irrelevance. Of course, as in India itself, it has become important in the 
NRI diaspora to install Gandhi's statues, encourage Indian schoolchildren to pen 
essays on Gandhi's relevance, and invite Congressmen in the US House of 
Representatives who casually vote for war resolutions to pontificate on the moral 
message of the Mahatma's teachings,8 but no one who has observed the wide 
approbation with which India's nuclear tests were received by Indian communities 
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in the US can doubt that Gandhi is viewed with complete indifference if not 
disdain as the sign of everything that India must renounce if it is to achieve 
respectability in the modem nation-state system. Though many of the NRis despise 
Gandhi's disavowal of nation-state politics and his repudiation of big science and 
lifestyles associated with "industrial civilization", they are also cognizant of the 
fact that Gandhi gives India a credibility and spiritual aura that nations envy, and 
his name furnishes one of the most important and conspicuous links to India for 
people who are otherwise ignorant of Indian history and politics. However critical 
they may be of Gandhi, a backward villager and lover of Muslims, the foe of 
Hindus, indeed the very 'Father of Pakistan' --in the presence of other Indians, few 
would allow themselves to look as anything but his most ardent admirers to the 
outside world. Thus seminars on the "relevance of Gandhi" are perennial favorites 
among those committed to war, the money-making classes, and those who might 
be styled spin doctors and political opportunists; they are certainly a relatively 
inexpensive way to earn cultural capital, not entirely unlike the numerous peace 
summits that the US, the world's largest manufacturer and exporter of heavy and 
small arms, not to mention its long and unmatched history of militaristic 
adventurism, holds from time to time. 
The extraordinary ambivalence underlying the NRI disposition towards 
Gandhi points still yet to a larger narrative. A profound anxiety of influence 
pervades the Indian diasporic communities of the North at the very moment when 
India seems poised to insert itself into the nexus of world culture. The sources and 
manifestations of this anxiety are numerous, but it will suffice to take note of some 
of the more salient ones. Though in the United States, which now houses the most 
sizeable Indian diasporic population in the world, Indians have done spectacularly 
well, and exercise a hugely disproportionate influence on the professions, the 
feeling that they remain invisible persists. A staple feature of local Indian 
newspapers are the pages enumerating the names and accomplishments of Indians 
raised to the ranks of Rhodes or Marshall Scholars, or otherwise victorious as 
winners of spelling bees.9 But these celebrations are not long-lasting, for their 
minimal political presence comes back to haunt Indians. Only one Indian, Dilip 
Singh Saund, has ever served in the US Congress, and that a time, from 1956 to 
1962, when the Indian community was of no consequence, numbering in the few 
thousands. Even in state-wide offices and state legislatures, Indian representation is 
extremely poor. While pleased that they are regarded as a model minority, a term 
whose politics the Indian community naively accepts as innocent, as a correct 
representation of what a minority can achieve if it sheds off the laziness and 
sneering habits of the black community, Indians nonetheless are pained at their 
political insignificance. 
The anguish of diasporic Indians extends much further to the thought that the 
world rides roughshod over India. A country with a billion-strong population 
should be deserving of more respect; for its size, India is doubtless the most 
unimportant country in the world. Let me illustrate this argument with a recent 
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example: as the Indian Express reported in a prominent headline on 10 March 
2003, "270 Indians 'beaten up' by police in Malaysia." Apparently this large 
number of Indians, almost all information technology professionals, were rounded 
up on the pretext that they were working without valid documents; many were 
kicked and slapped and imprisoned overnight; their passports were defaced before 
they were released the following day. The response of one reader to this story can 
be described as representative, and I quote: "India continues to be perceived as a 
poverty stricken nation with most people below the poverty line and average IQ 
level. As a NRI, I can emphatically state that we have not grown out of our Snake 
Charmer's image. Will Malaysia dare do this to the Chinese or Japanese? ... let us 
forget [not to speak of] the West."10 
To be an Indian is to extend an invitation to the world to trample upon 
oneself. Here, too, this pervasive anxiety stems from a wide array of 
considerations, only a few of which can be entertained at present. There is, to begin 
with, much resentment over the fact that China, a "communist" regime, appears to 
receive far more attention in American political and diplomatic circles than India. 
Diasporic Indians express incomprehension over the American preoccupation with 
China when, from their standpoint, the largest democracy in the world is clearly the 
more fitting partner for an alliance with the world's most advanced democracy. 
Those familiar with the apparatus of Asian studies in American universities will at 
once also recognize the fact that China (and Japan) absolutely dominate the 
conception of what constitutes "Asia". The reasons why this is the case need not 
detain us, varying as they do from the fact that the Chinese and Japanese 
established their presence on American soil well before the Indians did so, to the 
consideration that Japan has been, through much of the twentieth century, a 
political or economic power. India, all of South Asia, is only marginal to American 
considerations. The extraordinary fanfare over Jiang Zemin's visit to the US during 
the Clinton presidency is contrasted with the low-key reception given to Atal 
Behari Vajpayee, and India-West and India Abroad, to mention two of the well-
known newspapers of the Indo-American diaspora, meticulously document the 
slightest signs of any favors conferred upon the Indian government, such as the 
consent given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to meet with an Indian Army General on 
a visit to the US. These signs are supposed to represent India's growing standing in 
the world. Recent articles in these and similar newspapers have expressed 
unreserved enthusiasm over Henry Kissinger's apparent proclamation that India 
ought to be viewed as a major world power, and the mention of India in the New 
National Security Strategy of the United States (September 2002) is adduced with 
evident pride as proof of the respect that India is gaining in American political 
circles. Needless to say, such obsequiousness finds nothing amiss in receiving the 
approbation of criminals with delight, and the surrender to realpolitik is viewed as 
the necessary condition of increased cooperation with the US. 
Troubling as diasporic Indians find the American ambivalence over China, a 
country whose political shortcomings are apparently overlooked with ease as it 
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becomes the world's preeminent manufacturer of consumer goods, they rankle at 
the fact that Pakistan, a military dictatorship for a good bit of its history, seems to 
be on a more or less equal footing with India in American foreign policy. The 
immensely popular internet portal, Rediff.com, which has a large following among 
diasporic professionals, regularly hosts political commentators and former Indian 
army officers, many now settled in the US, who advocate punitive and decisive 
military action against Pakistan. As the former director of counter terrorism at 
RAW [Research and Analysis Wing], the spy agency of the Indian Government, 
wrote in a recent piece entitled "Stop barking, start biting", the Indian government 
must display steely determination in its endeavor to fight Islamic terrorism, or 
otherwise India will "continue to totter from one pan-Islamic bloodbath to another" 
(Raman, 2002). It is easy enough to argue that affluent diasporic Indians can 
embrace the military option without much thought since they scarcely have to 
suffer any consequences. The obvious merit of this observation should not, 
however, obscure the deep anxiety of influence which, as I have argued, informs 
diasporic Indians' views of Pakistan, and their complete incomprehension that a 
two-bit state which is the sponsor of terrorism in South Asia and a failure by any 
yardstick should be spoken of in the same breath as India. India's diplomatic 
failures, much like other political events such as the coups in Fiji, the most recent 
one in 2000 that overthrew a democratically elected government headed by an 
Indo-Fijian, are all viewed as reflections of the inability of the Indian nation-state 
to flex its muscles overseas. Thus the argument is advanced that if India wishes to 
make itself heard in the world, it shall have to do a great deal more than export its 
cultural products, yoga, samosas, and gurus. 
Cultural capital, evidently, can only go so far. However much they may 
welcome the Indianization of the globe, NRis Indians would much rather have the 
world view India with some fear and respect. The keenness with which NRis 
pursue the prospects of India's admission to the Security Council as a permanent 
member, a gesture which, if it were ever to materialize, would doubtless incur the 
opposition of Pakistan and perhaps China, can be adduced as a notable example of 
the ambition to see, in the words of the NRI economist Romesh Diwan, "India 
ascendant." 11 The US-India Political Action Committee's online petition, which 
calls upon viewers to "Support India for Permanent Membership of the UN 
Security Council", takes note of India's "ancient civilization", its role as a "major 
player" [?] in curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, its vast and growing 
economy, and its strategic location in Asia. 12 The petition gives much prominence 
to the fulminations of New York Times' Thomas Friedman (2003), who, following 
France's insistence that only a second Security Council resolution would authorize 
the world community to wage war upon Iraq, had advocated that India be offered a 
permanent place on the Council in lieu of France; it also quotes, with obvious 
relish, the observation by the conservative ideologue, Charles Krauthammer 
(2003), that "as soon as the dust settles in Iraq, we should push for an expansion of 
the Security Council -- with India and Japan as new permanent members --.to 
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dilute France's disproportionate and anachronistic influence." In a similar vein is an 
article by Mukesh Advani 13 , President of the Northern California-based South 
Asian Bar Association, whose case for India's permanent membership in the 
Security Council also enumerates India's "vast pool of technicians and scientists", 
its "huge strides in the Space technologies", and its status in the "third world" as a 
country providing "moral leadership." The apposition of "huge", "large", and 
"moral" comes effortlessly: if the United States is the paradigmatic instantiation of 
the justness of this alignment, why should India be viewed any differently? 
Moreover, in anticipation of the argument that a country where malnutrition afflicts 
50 percent of the population, and the literacy rate among women in some districts 
is less than 10 percent more than 50 years after independence, scarcely deserves 
permanent membership in the world's most elite political body, the author 
advances the view that "India being the sufferers [sic] of these evils can contribute 
a great [sic] towards formulating a workable approach at the UN on these issues."13 
These frequent discussions, heard with rapidly increasing. frequency over the last 
year, in the diasporic Indian press on India's entitlement to a permanent seat in the 
UN Security Council all take place without the slightest thought given to whether 
the Security Council is itself not an emphatic repudiation of the democratic process 
that the United Nations was supposed to embody. In this matter as in most others, 
the slightest evidence of support for India's claim in Western capitals is pounced 
upon with much relish, and Friedman's aforementioned article has lovingly been 
circulated by the Indian government among all its diplomatic missions. In the last 
analysis, India's famed beauty queens and the heaving bosoms of Bollywood films 
are at best a distraction from power. 
But Pakistan is more than just an irritant, a country that, thankfully, has never 
been viewed as a prospective candidate for permanent Security Council 
membership. Pakistan is also, if a reminder were necessary, a preeminently Islamic 
state, indeed, in middle-class Indian thinking, a theocratic state. For that very 
reason, it is both despised and secretly admired: despised because as residents of 
one democracy, howsoever pathetic a democracy, NRis must perforce declare their 
opposition to a state which fails to recognize the separation of religion and politics. 
Islam, I need not add, is viewed as particularly retrograde, a religion that is shaped 
by a conviction that, to quote again the observations of a former official of the 
espionage agency RAW, "it cannot coexist with other religions and that to kill in 
the interests of Islam and the Shariat is a religious obligation and not a sin, even if 
the killing involves the use of weapons of mass destruction" (Raman, 2002). But 
Islam, unlike Hinduism, at least attracts the attention of the world; and NRI-
Hindus, and the large middle-class population in India from which they largely 
derive their numbers, crave attention. To be a Hindu is nearly to be condemned to 
oblivion; it is to be relegated to the space that Dante described as limbo, to which 
are confined those who deserve neither praise nor blame. Once in a rare while a 
Jerry Falwell or a Pat Robertson comes along, declaring that Hinduism is the 
religion of Satan; but Falwell, Robertson, and their ilk among evangelical 
'----, 
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Christians hold similar views about Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism, and after a 
little excitement, indignation, and outrage their views are forgotten. About the only 
kind of attention Hinduism has otherwise received in the US, for instance, is 
through the Hare Krishnas, who not long ago made their presence felt at airports 
and other public places where they would gather, and who, quite unknown to most 
Indians and Americans alike, have gone to court explicitly in the endeavor to have 
Krsnaism declared a separate faith from Hinduism. So those who are supremely 
iconic of Hinduism in the American imagination disavow the description of 
"Hindus" by which others know them. 
The invisibility of Hinduism may be a source of anguish, but it is also 
something in which, admittedly, at least some NRis take pleasure. Religion is, 
understandably, viewed as a private matter by these NRis, and so the silence 
enveloping Hinduism in the US is tolerated; on the other hand, many diasporic 
Hindus hold to the view that the obscurity surrounding Hinduism leaves it without 
protections available to more organized and visible religions. Among the most 
prominent organizations now in the vanguard to safeguard Hinduism against the 
depredations of fanatics and corporate interests is one that styles itself "American 
Hindus Against Defamation" (AHAD). AHAD has warned that one of a series of 
"Trash Talker Dolls" created by a Florida toy company, which features "Mr. 
Patel", could incite anti-Indian and anti-Hindu sentiments (Tsering, 2002). 14 
Among the utterances of "Mr. Patel" is this line, "Hamburger. Everything on it, 
please, but no beef', 15 a stereotype that feeds on what is to Americans a vaguely 
known sentiment that Hindus hold the cow in veneration and abjure from the 
consumption of beef. "Mr. Patel", alarmingly, sports a turban, which to AHAD 
suggests that Hindus Patel being most often a Hindu name, and in the US always a 
name which evokes images of motels are being conflated with Muslims, and most 
particularly with terrorists of the Osama bin Laden variety. 
In the last two years, AHAD has been unusually busy, conducting vigorous 
campaigns against a number of companies charged with the exploitation of Hindu 
deities and the profanation of the Hindu faith. Their wrath has fallen upon the 
kitchen and bath appliances company Kohler, which released a glossy 
advertisement of a scantily-clad woman with four arms and a raised right leg who 
is clearly a representation ofNataraja, the dancing Shiva (Swapan, 2002), the West 
Coast microbrewery Lost Coast which produced an Indian pale ale that carried 
Ganesh's picture on the front, 16 and most recently American Eagle Outfitters for 
marketing flip flops with images of Ganesh on the sole. 17 One might well agree 
that a foot placed on a sole bearing the image of a deity represents a gross insult to 
Hinduism, but since when did Hindu deities become so fragile? One suspects that 
"American Hindus" are not familiar with the large canvas of Indian literature 
known as the Puranas, which ought to be the heritage of everyone who purports to 
describe himself or herself as a Hindu, and which are ecumenical enough to 
entertain conceptions of Hindu deities who are often given over to erotic, playful, 
and even perverse activities. In Indian cities, it has even become something of a 
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well-known ploy to paint large images of Hindu deities on well-traversed public 
pavements and footpaths, and then entice people to step around these images and 
throw money on them. In their haste people do sometimes trample upon these 
images, and must then make nominal monetary amends. Yet none of this induces 
any degree of self-reflection among "American Hindus". 
AHAD's most spectacular campaign to date has been against the toilet seat 
manufacturer Sittin' Pretty, which placed images of Shiva, Kali, and Ganesh on 
toilet seat covers (Sundaram, 2000a). AHAD contends that Hindu images, which 
are "cool" and popular among followers of Semitic faiths who may well be starved 
of images of the divine, are assumed to be public property, 18 and that the reverence 
extended to other religions is entirely wanting in the American experience of 
Hinduism. AHAD's convenor, Ajay Shah, has described the toilet seat covers as 
"an outrageously insensitive use of Hindu symbolism" (Anon, 2000:40): Hindu 
images may· be "cool", but, evidently,. one can also, so to speak, shit on them. 
"Little did we know", AHAD's website states apropos of the toilet seats planted 
with images of Hindu deities, "that there is no limit to how low can one sink when 
it comes to the depiction of revered Hindu images."19 AHAD is at a loss to explain 
why, if Hinduism appears to bear the burden of commercial obscenities, Sittin' 
Pretty should also have placed the Holy Mary on one of its toilet seat covers. True, 
the manufacturer appears not to have placed an image of the Holy Mary cover on 
its website, but it can also be argued that to the manufacturer all divine images are 
fair game. What could have been a critique of the relentless logic of the market 
becomes, in AHAD's hands, resentment over the base treatment that is apparently 
reserved for Hindus and their faith. That Sittin' Pretty can so casually place Hindu 
deities on its toilet seat covers is an expression not necessarily of contempt for 
Hinduism, but more so of the fact that categories such as "reverence" and "sacred" 
have lost much of their purchase under conditions of modernity. What AHAD 
needs to be engaged with here is a critique of modernity and market-place morality, 
but this is much too difficult: its own frame of reference is furnished· by the very 
institutions and cultural practices that devolve from modernity, such as the idea of 
demanding a political apology. AHAD demanded, and received, an apology from 
Sittin' Pretty, whose co-owner, Lamar van Dyke, described "our beloved Goddess 
Kali" and "Lord Ganesha" as deities to whom "we feel personally close", adding: 
"We meant neither harm nor insult, and apologize to the Hindus of the world for 
unintentionally upsetting them" (Sundaram, 2000b ). Little does AHAD realize that 
an epidemic of apologies has engulfed us, and that "apology" itself has become a 
category of market-place morality (Lal, 1999a). 
It is perfectly reasonable for people to become agitated ifthey believe that 
their religious sentiments have been violated or profaned, and crass commercial 
exploitation of religious icons and beliefs is to be at least as much deplored as the 
naked use of religion in the service of political extremism. Doubtless, some absurd 
defense of Sittin' Pretty's rights of free expression of speech and artistic license is 
not inconceivable, but Sittin' Pretty will find few defenders. Still, one must ask 
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how "defamation" came to be an operative category for Hindus, just as one must 
probe those who would deploy the category of "blasphemy" to describe offences 
committed against Hinduism. Whatever moral charge there may be in the term 
"defamation", it is today preeminently a legal category, and Hinduism's defenders 
have consistently maintained that matters of religious belief are outside the 
purview of the legal system. By way of example, consider that though the dispute 
over the "origins" of the now-destroyed Babri Masjid has been placed under the 
jurisdiction of India's Supreme Court, the ideologues of Hindutva have time after 
time declared that Hinduism's "truths" cannot be legislated, and that the decision 
of the court will not be binding upon Hindus. There is also the consideration that 
Hinduism, which has managed reasonably well without vigorous defenders in the 
diaspora, now has an alarming number of aggressive votaries in the West. One 
should not merely marvel, but tremble, at the fact that in its wisdom, the Federation 
of Hindu Associations, a US-based umbrella organization, conferred one of its 
recent annual "Hindu of the Year" awards upon the Shiv Sena leader Bal 
Thackeray, who has openly declared his admiration for Hitler and deploys Nazi-
like tactics to terrorize various non-Maharashtrian communities (Hansen, 2002), 
and Sadhvi Ritambhara, whose public speeches caricaturize Muslims as castrated 
men and eunuchs (Kakar, 1995:197-214). The citation accompanying the award 
commended Thackeray for his defense of the Hindu faith against the evil-minded. 
Readers would have been reminded of the fact that Vishnu from time to time sends 
incarnations to save the world from the wicked. 
The existence of "American Hindus Against Defamation" and other similar 
organizations is evidence not, as is commonly supposed, of the belated awareness 
that Hinduism is as much entitled to protection as any other religion, but of a 
profound anxiety at the heart of militantly resurgent Hinduism. In the world-view 
of those who style themselves advocates of Hindutva, Hinduism is not quite a 
proper religion, and certainly not a world religion. It is not merely the case that, 
until the migrations of the nineteenth century, Hinduism was confined almost 
exclusively to South Asia, barring those periods when Hinduism was transmitted to 
large parts of Southeast Asia. Even in Vietnam, Java, Cambodia, and Thailand, 
where Hindu dynasties once prevailed, Hinduism survives not as a living faith, but 
as a set of cultural practices and as the repository of literary. traditions and 
mythological motifs. The Hinduism of the Javanese is a profound phenomenon, 
one that few Hindus recognize, and the shadow plays and dances of the Javanese 
are predominantly populated by stories drawn from the Ramayana, the 
Mahabharata, and the vast mythic lore of Puranic Hinduism; and yet the Javanese 
remain resolutely Muslim. By "world religion", however, I obviously wish to 
convey a great deal more, since most Hindus themselves do not view Hinduism as 
having a worldwide appeal in the manner of Christianity and Islam. Many 
commentators have spoken of the masculinization of Hinduism in recent years; 
others have described what might be termed "the semitic turn" in Hinduism. The 
Hinduism of its most militant advocates, it is alleged, seeks to emulate the Semitic 
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faiths, such that Tulsidas's Ramacaritmanas (or, perhaps, the Bhagavad Gita) 
becomes the preeminent book of the Hindus, a people among whom no one book is 
supremely authoritative; similarly, the elevation of Rama, and the intent focus on 
Ayodhya as his supposed birthplace, are described as being indicative of the 
tendency to furnish Hinduism with a single messiah, and the historical specificity, 
that the religion is said to lack. 
The literature here is prolific, and there is something substantive to be said for 
some of these interpretive moves. The analogy with Semitism is much less than 
perfect, as even a rudimentary analysis of Hindutva's multiple political agendas 
suggests, besides having other disturbing implications that one might wish to 
disown: the critics of the "Semitic turn", one might plausibly argue, have rendered 
the Semitic faiths into monolithic constructs. Christianity is witnessing its most 
rapid expansion in Africa, but if Hindutva's ideologues are religious bigots, they 
are also racial-minded, and in this respect at least they are inclined to see 
Christianity, which must find new converts in the "dark continent", as a faith on 
the wane. Quite considerable, then, are the difficulties with viewing Hinduism's 
turn towards Hindutva as an emulation of the Semitic faiths, though the attraction 
of Islam for Hindutva, as I have previously suggested, is not to be underestimated, 
even though it can never be publicly admitted. At the same time, it would be 
difficult to overstate the intensely masculinist metaphors of Thackeray's public 
discourses, the glorification of martial values in Hindutva writings, the unabashed 
celebration of virility as a virtue without which nation-states cannot thrive, and the 
openly chauvinist and patriarchal leanings of Hindutva ideologues and their 
supporters. It serves some purpose, consequently, to speak of the aspiration of 
Hinduism's most vigorous votaries to be a proper as well as world religion. As a 
polycentric, polymorphous, and polyphonic religion, Hinduism is the very picture 
of chaos. Thus, to take one example, it becomes imperative in Hindutva thinking to 
disown the legendary "330 million gods and goddesses of Hinduism" and to 
suggest that one god lurks behind all these apparitions; Hinduism, in other words, 
is just as monotheistic as the semitic faiths. Moreover, if nation-states get the 
religion that they deserve, then it is apposite that a soft nation-state such as India 
should be the home to the softest religion on earth. Should one be surprised that 
Hindutva has flourished under the dispensation of the Bharatiya Janata Party, and 
that the same party, in one of its first deeds after it came to office, openly 
transformed India into a nuclear state? 
At this present juncture of history, as I have argued, the Indian diaspora gives 
rise to uncertainties even as it celebrates its accomplishments and revels at diverse 
signs of the Indianization of the globe. I have placed at the center of my argument 
the idea that a pervasive anxiety of influence is attendant upon the engagement of 
middle-class, modernizing Indians, especially Non-resident Indians (NRis), with 
the world. Studies of the Indian diaspora (especially in the affluent North), as well 
as of Hinduism, have been indifferent to, indeed oblivious of, such considerations, 
but this may, perhaps, be one of the more productive ways to gain a grasp over the 
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complex issues that have come to the fore with the advent of globalization. What 
some commentators have described as the "Semitic turn" in militant Hinduism 
might, with greater justice, be described as the "turn towards globalization" a turn 
that is aimed at homogenizing Hinduism, transforming it into a world religion, and 
placing it within categories of knowledge that would make it into a proper religion. 




• I owe the lovely phrase "Balti Britain' to Ziauddin Sardar. "Balti' restaurants have 
proliferated over the last decade. Though 'haiti' in Hindustani refers to a bucket, used in the 
bathroom and toilet, it is alleged that haiti cuisine takes its name from Baltistan in northern 
Pakistan. It is noteworthy that Indian food has even been served at a state dinner at 
Buckingham Palace. 
2
• This gathering, which took place in New Delhi in January 2003, is known as 'Pravasi 
Bharatiya Divas'; see below for further discussion. 
3
. Every nuanced contribution to the literature on diasporas seems to show awareness of the 
difficulties attendant upon deploying the term 'diaspora', and this awareness is all that is 
called for at this juncture. 
4
• As Advisor to the Prime Minister, Pitroda held the rank of minister on national technology 
missions. 
5
• There are over 600,000 such public calling offices or booths in the country, furnishing 
employment to over I million people. 
6
• That indentured labor followed the abolition of slavery in British territories, and that 
Indians came to stand in for Negro populations, were facts that would, in the hands of most 
historians, rapidly slide into oblivion. 
7
. The website of the Bajrang Dal and Youth Wing of the VHP, http://www.hinduunity.org, 
marked January 30th as "Mahatma Nathuram Godse Diwas". "Mahatma" is rendered into 
English as "great soul"; "Duratma" means "the wicked one". More recently, the website 
enjoins viewers to "Celebrate Shri Nathuram Godse's Birth on May 19th", and urges them to 
"send a message to the enemies of humanity that we will fight and even die to protect the 
basic principles of Hinduism." The site goes on to describe Gandhi "as a downright 
PACIFIST, without guts and SCRUPLES. His constant preaching to his fellow Hindus, to 
be nonviolent at all times, EVEN IN THE FACE OF AGGRESSION, paralyzed the 
manhood oflndia, mentally and physically." See http://www.hinduunitv.org 
8
• See, for example, the three pages of coverage on Gandhi-related events in and around 
Chicago in the Indian Reporter (II October 2002), pp. 27-29. "Gandhian thought still 
relevant" (p. 27) furnishes some details of a conference held at the University of Chicago 
where the Indian Consul-General, Chicago, provided introductory remarks; the following 
two pages host an article by Jatinder Singh Bedi, "Gandhi statue unveiled in Milwaukee." 
9
. A not inconsiderable portion of the community life of Indians revolves around these 
spelling bees, in which Indians have acquitted themselves very well. The 1985, 1988, 1999, 
2000, 2002, and 2003 national championships were won by Indians. 
10
• Comment online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/messages.php?content id=19870#697 
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11
. Online at http://www.sulekha.com/column.asp?cid=298065 As of 22 May 2003, this 
article, some 35 pages in length, had been accessed 3,141 times; the web site where it 
appears, sulekha.com, is widely frequented by NRis. The author describes himself as a 
Gandhian, and has written on Gandhian economics; but the entire piece, an elaborate 
defense of not only Hindutva ideology, but the debased politics of the nation-state, becomes 
an attack upon the Indian middle-class in India, who are said to be living in mental slavery, 
while Resident Bharatiya Indians [RBis], a term that Diwan prefers to Non-resident Indians, 
among whom Diwan living in New York numbers himself, are described as the vanguard 
of an "ascendant India." Apparently, the only good Indians are those who are living 
overseas. Here, then, is a new Orientalism to replace the old cliche that the only good Indian 
is a dead one, though the fondness for ancient (pre-Islamic) India displayed by Hindutva 
ideologues suggests that the old Orientalism is by no means. lifeless. In India, as we have 
heard, the hot Weather, corruption, habits of laziness, bureaucratic inefficiency, and Oriental 
despotism together take their toll of those who wish to do good. Thirty or forty years of 
dabbling in Gandhi have, evidently, not taught Diwan anything about Gandhi; not only that, 
the entire article is an exercise in self-congratulation. The 2-page biographical note 
concludes thus: "He is a member of 20 professional associations and was invited to Prime 
Minister Atal Vajpayee's swearing ceremony on Oct 13, 99." Even as Diwan speaks 
boastfully of RBis, does he do anything more than betray his own extreme insecurity? 
12
• http://www.petitiononline.com/USINP AC/petition.html 
13
. Mukesh Advani, "India's Bid for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council", online 
at: wysiwyg:l/18/http://www.indolink.com/ Analysis/aO 12003-173350.php [accessed 19 
March 2003] 
14
• See also the discussion on www.redhotcurrv.com/views/trash talker.htm 
15
• This can be heard online at: http://www.trashtalkerdolls.com/sounds/indian_3.mp3 
16
• See http://ratebeer.com/ShowBeer.asp?BeeriD=5556 
17
. "Trampling on Hindu Sentiments: Footwear with Ganesh Images", India-West (2 May 
2003), p. A37. 
18
• Sittin' Pretty's activities were brought to the attention of the Rajya Sabha, the Upper 
House of the Indian Parliament, where a demand was voiced that the Indian government 
should pressurize the US government to take legal action against the Seattle-based firm. 
Vijay Singh Yadav of the Rashtriya Janata Dal is reported to have said that "there was a 
current craze in the U.S. about Hindu gods and firms were exploiting it by painting figures 
of Hindu gods on toilet covers." See Anon (2000). 
19
. http://www.hindunet.org/anti defamation/sittinpretty However "cool" the images, I 
suspect that Hindu Gods leave some of us hot, some of us cold: the Japanese, who have 
invented toilet seats that can be heated with the press of a button, would doubtless have put a 
different spin on the whole affair. 
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